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The Weekend Effect in Television Viewership
and Prime-Time Scheduling
Jungwon Yeo1
 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016
Abstract The observed drops in the ratings of television programs on Fridays and
Saturdays are likely a result of two factors: intrinsic contraction in demand for
television watching and endogenous scheduling. I decompose the observed weekend
effect into the effects from these two factors. To this end, I estimate a viewer choice
model that uses aggregate Nielsen ratings data for prime-time network television
shows over 11 years. The long span of the data enables me to control for television
series qualities. The estimation results reveal that the estimated weekend effect is
dampened as the empirical model accounts for variation in the program quality
compositions. The counterfactual analysis that is based on the estimates of the
preferred specification indicates that endogenous scheduling accounts for two-thirds
of the rating drops on weekends.
Keywords Day-of-the-week effect  Prime-time television  Discrete choice model 
Optimal scheduling
JEL Classification L82  D22
1 Introduction
Periodic or cyclic variation, also known as seasonality, is nothing new to many time
series variables. Retail sales in the US peak during the Thanksgiving and Christmas
season. Movie ticket sales peak in summer, generating July’s box-office that, on
average, is twice as big as January’s. Stock market returns tend to be larger on
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Fridays than Mondays. In this paper, I study the periodic variation in prime-time
television viewership.
One stylized fact about television viewership is that viewership ratings fall on
Fridays and Saturdays. It can be derived that people tend to engage in other
activities rather than watching television on weekends. An economic model would
capture such substitution as a result of a rise in the opportunity cost of, or a fall in
the utility from, watching television. Therefore, in principle, one can easily estimate
the weekend effect by projecting the differential in weekday and weekend ratings
into the utility space. However, in practice, the observed weekend effect also
includes an additional feature: The television program schedules are endogenous.
This paper aims to separate the market contraction effect on weekends that arises as
a consequence of endogenous scheduling from the demand-shift effect.
Understanding the periodic nature of television viewing is important to
broadcasting companies to whom optimizing broadcast schedules is a key to
maximizing advertising revenue. It may also be of policy makers’ interest. Although
traditional television is waning with the growing availability and popularity of
online video streaming service, it is still the most popular mode of entertainment for
Americans. According to a recent report by Nielsen, an average American spends 4 h
and 32 min per day watching traditional TV, while Americans spend 30 min
watching time-shifted TV.1
To estimate the day-of-the-week effects in television viewership, I formulate a
discrete choice demand model for TV programs where a viewer’s indirect utility
from watching a particular program depends on the day of the week and the time
slot. I estimate the model using Nielsen ratings data that span over 11 years. The
long span of the data enables me to control for each television series’ quality while
the estimation method by Berry et al. (1995) allows me, despite the aggregate nature
of the data, to incorporate viewer preference heterogeneity for TV program genres.
The estimation results demonstrate the importance of controlling for the endogenous
scheduling: The estimated weekend effect is dampened as the empirical model
accounts for variation in the television series qualities.
The structural approach allows me, through counterfactual analysis, to decom-
pose the observed weekend effect into the effect from demand contraction and that
from endogenous scheduling. I first test whether the estimated broadcast day and
hour effects justify the observed schedules; that is, whether the reshuffling of
weekly broadcast schedules generates higher ratings for television networks. In
most cases, the counterfactual rating falls below the actual one. It indicates that the
estimates of the underlying broadcast day and hour effects are reasonably consistent
with the television networks’ rating maximization in the Nash equilibrium context. I
then simulate two counterfactual scenarios: one with no day-of-the-week effects and
the other with no endogenous scheduling. The results indicate that the intrinsic
contraction in demand for television viewing accounts for only one-third of the
observed rating drops on weekends.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 reviews related studies and
Sect. 3 describes the data. I present the viewer choice model in Sect. 4, and discuss
1 http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/reports/2014/the-total-audience-report.html.
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modeling issues and the identification strategy. I present the estimation results in
Sect. 5 with robustness checks. Section 6 considers counterfactual scenarios to
decompose the observed weekend effect into the intrinsic part and the endogenous
part. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper is most similar to Einav (2007) in that both study seasonality in media
industries. Einav (2007) focuses on the seasonality in the movie industry, while this
paper studies the weekend effect in TV viewership.
There is a strand of papers that estimates a viewer’s program choice model. More
recent examples include Shachar and Emerson (2000). They find that there is
preference heterogeneity for show categories. I incorporate this, given the aggregate
data, with random coefficients on show categories while they link the viewer
preference for particular genres and shows with viewer demographics.
Some papers in the strand account for the weekend effect. Goettler and Shachar
(2001) estimates a viewer’s choice model with micro-level panel data over a week,
accounting for the Friday effect. Because there is no variation in the programs
offered on Friday, however, the estimated effect is likely compounded by the market
contraction effect of endogenous scheduling. Other examples include Wilbur (2008)
who estimates viewer demand for television programs with the use of aggregate
viewer data over a four-week period. His estimation results indicate that viewers
like watching television on Thursday and Friday nights, and notes that this contrasts
with the broadcast networks’ tendency to air low-quality programs on Friday nights.
While many papers in this strand have an edge against this paper in that their
viewer choice models can examine how the viewer demographics are related to the
television viewing patterns, they cannot separate the day-of-the-week effect from
the market contraction effect—mainly because of the short span of the individual-
level data.
One aspect of my viewer-choice model is to explicitly account for the so-called
lead-in effect: A program with a big rating confers an advantage to the following
program because viewers tend to stay with the channel that they were previously
watching even after the program ended. The lead-in effect is well documented and
studied in the literature on television audience flow (e.g, Rust and Alpert 1984; Rust
et al. 1992; Shachar and Emerson 2000) and viewer inertia (e.g, Moshkin and
Shachar 2002; Esteves-Sorenson and Perretti 2012).2 The source of the lead-in
effect, in my model, is the extra utility that a viewer receives from watching
programs back-to-back on the same broadcast network channel.
This paper relates to another strand of papers on the broadcast network’s
scheduling and programming. Danaher and Mawhinney (2001) examine the
rescheduling of television programs to maximize the total ratings for a network
2 Shachar and Anand (1998) estimate a model of television viewing decisions to examine the sources of
the viewership persistency. Shachar and Emerson (2000) incorporate the viewer inertia with switching
costs that vary across show types and viewer demographics.
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across a week using the results from a choice experiment in which television
programs are rescheduled and presented to respondents. Kennedy (2002) tests for
herd behavior in prime-time television programming. I add to these papers by
considering reshuffling of the network channels’ schedules to examine the estimated
broadcast day and hour effects based on the revealed preference principle.
3 Data
The data encompass all TV shows that were broadcast on the four major networks—
ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox—between January 1, 1999 and May 24, 2009 over 3797
days. They include each program’s title, genre, broadcast time, Nielsen ratings,
whether it’s a new episode or a rerun, and the season and episode number if it’s a
new episode of a television series. The Nielsen ratings measure the share of
television households who watch the given program, out of all television
households.
The schedules and ratings are taken from two magazines. The ratings for
programs that were broadcast from 1999 to March 25, 2007 are from Broadcast &
Cable, and the remainder are from TVWeek. Because several issues of Broadcast &
Cable contain no rating information, I have complete rating information for 3557
days. The season and episode information is mostly taken from http://epguides.com
and www.tvtango.com. The program category variable was manually encoded based
on each show’s Wikipedia page or tv.com page. For cable/satellite channels beyond
the four broadcast network channels, I only observe their combined ratings.
Among 3557 days with complete ratings information, I drop all observations
from June to August, and Sundays. Most television series tend to run from
September to May. Television networks tend to broadcast reruns of series or
specials from June to August. As I treat most of the irregular, non-series programs
as episodes of one series named ‘‘Others’’ , these observations would provide little,
and noisy if any, information for the quality compositions that differ across the
different days of the week. For the same reason, I also drop days during which at
any time slot, all four TV networks broadcast sports or specials. The final sample
includes 27,696 programs on 2329 days over 11 television seasons.
The top panel of Table 1 presents the ratings across the days of the week at the
aggregate level. The average share of households using television (HUT) plunges on
Friday and Saturday, obtaining only 83–90 % of the typical weekday ratings and the
network television ratings drop to only 58–78 % of the weekday ratings. The bottom
panel presents the average rating of the network television prime-time programs by
their broadcast days of the week. The average rating is highest on Thursday and
lowest on Saturday. Whereas the average rating is around 7.0–7.9 on weekdays, it is
only 5.4 on Friday and 4.7 on Saturday.
In this study, television series play an important role in identifying the market
contraction effects because the fact that they are repeatedly observed—although
with different episodes—enables me to control for show qualities. The final sample
include 573 network television series/title groups. There are an additional 20 title
groups that are represented by dummy variables to estimate the constant quality
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measure within each group. They include groups of sports programs, such as
‘‘Olympic games’’ and ‘‘NFL games,’’ several documentary series, and ‘‘Others’’
which includes movies, pageant and award shows, and any other special or irregular
programs.
For 551 out of 573 series, I know whether each airing is a new episode or a rerun,
and, if new, its broadcast season and episode number. The remaining 22 series lack
such information because they are mostly news magazines. The longest running TV
series in the sample is ‘‘Law & Order,’’ whose 9th season to 19th season were
broadcast during the sample period. Four hundred and sixty eight television series
began their broadcasts during the sample period, and 458 series ended during the
sample period. I observe the complete series from start to finish for 382 series. Out
of these complete series, only 103 series were renewed after their first broadcast
seasons.
In Table 2, I consider whether a television series was renewed or cancelled after
its first season depending on the day of the week on which its premiere episode was
broadcast. For this counting exercise, I consider only those, among 573 television
Table 1 Shares of television-
watching households by
broadcast days
Households using television
(HUT): share of households
watching television out of all
television households
M T W Th F Sa
Average shares of television-watching households
HUT
Obs. 394 385 388 386 393 383
Mean 63.69 62.99 61.04 61.36 54.78 53.17
SD 3.45 3.27 3.26 3.89 3.12 3.44
Network TV
Mean 26.28 30.15 26.29 28.35 20.52 17.58
SD 4.63 5.26 5.49 6.55 4.70 4.78
Non-network TV
Mean 37.41 32.85 34.75 33.02 34.25 35.59
SD 4.12 4.58 4.88 5.41 4.67 4.54
Average prime-time network program rating
Obs. 4782 5067 4829 4877 4517 3624
Mean 7.39 7.16 6.98 7.86 5.44 4.67
SD 2.74 3.01 2.99 4.22 2.17 1.86
Table 2 Renewal/cancellation of TV series by broadcast days
M T W Th F Sa S Total
Day of the premiere episode
Total 84 97 97 60 64 11 37 450
Renew 35 30 36 21 12 1 27 162
Renewal rate 41.67 % 30.93 % 46 % 37.11 % 23.08 % 9.09 % 72.97 %a 36.00 %
a Because the final sample does not include Sundays, Sunday is over-represented by series that were later
moved to other days of the week and renewed
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series included in the final sample, whose whole first season falls in the original
sample. There are 450 such television series. While the average probability of
renewal is 36 %, it is only 23 and 9 % for series that premiered on Friday and
Saturday.3 This exercise confirms the phenomenon that gave Friday evening slots a
notorious nickname: ‘‘Friday night death slot’’ ; but it remains unclear whether the
low renewal rate is due to the low quality of the programs that have been aired, or to
the low demand for television viewing on Fridays.
Although the data span 11 years, if broadcasting companies tend to fix the
broadcast day of each series, the variation in the combination in the qualities of TV
shows offered on different days of the week can be limited. Table 3 presents the
variation along this dimension by counting the number of different days of the week
on which any episode of a series was broadcast. The second column counts the
number over the entire series run for the 382 series for which both the series
premiere and the finale were broadcast during the sample period. It shows that more
than half of the series (198) were broadcast on the same day of the week through
their entire series runs. For these series, I do not observe how their ratings varied
depending on which day of the week they were broadcast, which thus limit the
needed variation. Most of these series, however, lasted only one television season
before cancellation.
When we consider the 103 series that lasted multiple seasons, the majority of the
series were broadcast on two to four different days of the week. To see whether the
changes in the broadcasting days occurred across television seasons, I consider
(television series, television season) pairs so that a television series appears in the
same number of pairs as the number of seasons it lasted. The 103 television series
generate 918 series-season pairs. Among them, 66 % have the same broadcast day
of the week, as shown in the third and last column respectively. This implies that a
television network tends to fix the broadcast day of a series during its seasonal run,
but usually explores several different days of the week throughout the series’
lifespan.
Table 4 summarizes the distribution of program categories for 27,696 television
programs in the data set. In my model, viewers are heterogenous in their preference
for television program genres, which is captured by random coefficients on six show
category variables. ‘‘Comedy’’ and ‘‘Action/Crime drama’’ are two most popular
categories. Comedy includes sitcom such as Friends, comedy drama, comedy
variety such as America’s Funniest Home Videos as well as animation such as The
Simpsons. Action/Crime drama include all action, police procedural, legal, military,
and adventure dramas such as CSI and Law & Order.
The ‘‘Drama, Other’’ category includes drama other than action/crime drama,
such as mystery/thriller, SciFi/fantasy/supernatural, teen/family and medical drama.
A popular medical drama series Grey’s Anatomy and a comedy drama series
Desperate Housewives fall under this show category. The ‘‘Reality/Game Show’’
category includes reality television such as Supernanny and competition/dating/tal-
ent shows such as Survivor, American Idol, and The Bachelor as well as more
3 Among the 450 television series considered, only 267 series were broadcast on the same day throughout
its entire first season.
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traditional studio game shows such as Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?. News
magazine series, such as 20/20 and Primetime, are categorized as ‘‘News
Magazine’’ ; this category also includes several documentary series. ‘‘Sports,
Specials, and Others’’ includes all sports game broadcast shows and all non-series
specials such as award and pageant shows, news specials, biography specials, and
seasonal specials such as Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade.
Table 5 presents how program categories are related to the broadcast time slots
by counting the number of TV programs in each category that were broadcast at
each 30 min time slot. The reason why the number of drama, reality, and news
magazine programs drop at the second 30 min of each hour is that most shows in
these categories are 1 h long, whereas comedy shows are typically 30 min long.
Television networks tend to schedule comedy and reality programs between 8 and 9
o’clock, whilst drama and news magazines are scheduled mostly after 9 o’clock,
especially action/crime drama after 10 o’clock. This is most likely due to changes in
the demographics of viewers along the prime-time hours.4
While TVWeek reports average ratings for each 30 min time slot, Broadcast &
Cable reports average ratings over each program’s duration. To put the two data sets
together, I take the average of 30 min ratings if a program runs longer than 30 min.
4 Goettler and Shachar (2001) and Shachar and Emerson (2000) document changes in viewer
demographics along the prime-time hours and incorporate them in their viewer choice models.
Table 3 Variation in broadcast days
No. of different days of
the week
No. of series
(complete, all)
No. of series (complete,
multi-year)
No. of series-season
pairs
1 198 26 609
2 118 38 235
3–4 55 33 61
 5 6 11 13
Total 382 103 918
Sunday broadcasts are not counted. The sample includes 918 series-season pairs such that all new
episodes of the television series in the season were broadcast over the sample period
Table 4 Distribution of
program categories
Categories No. of series No. of programs
Comedy 201 (35.1 %) 8110 (29.3 %)
Action/Crime 76 (13.3 %) 5487 (19.8 %)
Drama, Other 152 (26.5 %) 4576 (16.5 %)
Reality/Game Show 131 (22.9 %) 4250 (15.4 %)
News Magazine 13 (2.3 %) 2500 (9.0 %)
Sports – 831 (3.0 %)
Specials (non-series) – 1942 (7.0 %)
Total 573 27,696
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In reality, viewers can decide to start or stop watching television at any moment,
and the rating of a program continuously changes.5 To ensure that the model also
predicts a constant rating during a program’s run, I assume that the timing of viewer
decision-making is discrete, and that no viewer can switch in or out of the program
once it starts.
This assumption is restrictive, and taking the average rating is likely to cause a
loss of information. For example, on one day, the rating for the first 30 min of a 1-h
episode of an ABC series called Extreme Makeover: Home Edition was 3.1 and it
was 6.3 for the second 30 min. While this could be due to a change in the plot, it
coincides with the drop in the CBS’s rating by 3.5 upon the end of a popular reality
competition show, The Amazing Race, followed by 60 Min, a news magazine show.
A loss of information on such substitution could weaken identification of the
random coefficients on television program genres.
Table 6, however, shows that the variation in ratings within a program is small
for most programs. The average coefficient of variation of ratings for 30 min blocks
within a program is only 5.5 %. Especially, for show categories such as drama that
has a continuous, running plot, the average coefficient of variation is 4.5 %. Based
on these results, it is reasonable to assume that the small amount of variation is not
due to an equal amount of many switch-ins and switch-outs, but rather because only
a few people switch in and out during a show.6
Finally, I present evidence for the lead-in effect. To this end, I run regression of
the program ratings on the lead-in program’s ratings while controlling for various
other factors that can affect the ratings. Table 7 presents the estimate of the
coefficient on the lead-in rating. The coefficient estimates are statistically and
economically significant, and robust to the inclusion of the series (title group) fixed
effects and the series-season pair fixed effects, which implies that the state-
dependence is likely structural rather than spurious.
Table 5 Program categories by broadcast time
Time Comedy Action/Crime Drama, Other Reality/Game Show News Magazine
8:00–8:30 2592 980 1366 2193 487
8:30–9:00 2218 4 66 548 3
9:00–9:30 1677 1713 1692 1130 726
9:30–10:00 1552 26 171 166 13
10:00–10:30 47 2748 1275 205 1256
10:30–11:00 24 16 6 8 15
Total 8110 5487 4576 4250 2500
Excludes Sundays
5 Nielsen’s minute-by-minute rating data are available for purchase.
6 Shachar and Emerson (2000)’s estimation results show that the switching costs are higher during a
program than between programs and especially when the program’s category is drama.
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4 Model
Let Jt ¼ fABC, CBS, NBC, FOX, Cable, No TVg denote the set of TV programs
available at time t ¼ ðD; d; sÞ where D denotes the broadcast date, d indexes the day
of the week, and s 2 f8 : 009:00 p.m.; 9:0010:00 p.m.; 10:0011:00 p.m.g the
1 h-long time slot. Cable is a composite alternative that includes PBS, cable/satellite
television networks such as WB and CNN, and all other channels besides the four
broadcast networks.
Viewer i’s utility from watching a program in series (title group) j on broadcast
network nj 2 N ¼ fABC;CBS;NBC; FOXg at time t is given by
uijt ¼ xjbi þ bdd þ bssþ a  1 nit1 ¼ nj
 þ fj þ njt þ ijt ð1Þ
where xj denotes observed attributes of program j and nit1 indicates the network
channel that viewer i watched in the previous time slot. Viewer i’s utility from
watching a program on any cable channel is given by
uict ¼ bdd þ bssþ fc þ nct þ ict:
The utility from the outside option—not watching television—is normalized to zero.
If a viewer watches programs back-to-back on the same channel, she receives
extra utility a.7 Notice that this extra utility exists only for the four broadcast
Table 6 Coefficient of variation of 30 min ratings within a program (%)
Obs Mean SD Min Max
All 4206 5.50 4.46 0 45.93
Action/Crime & Drama, Others 2484 4.46 3.64 0 24.96
Reality/Game Show 991 6.81 4.78 0 45.93
I compute the coefficient of variation of 30-min ratings for programs that take multiple 30-min blocks and
whose ratings are taken from TVWeek which reports ratings over each 30 min block. Broadcast & Cable
reports the average rating over each program’s duration
Table 7 Lead-in effects
*** p\ 0.01
Dependent variable: ratings
Lead-in rating .514*** .430*** .367***
(.006) (.006) (.005)
Rerun Dummy Y Y Y
Year (TV season) FE Y Y Y
Day FE Y Y Y
Time Slot FE Y Y Y
Genre FE Y Y Y
Series (Title Group) FE N Y –
Series-season FE N N Y
Adjusted R2 .551 .850 .944
7 Note that the extra utility term does not depend on the show categories of the previous and current
programs. In the data, it is found that for comedy, the lead-in effect is greater if a program that is in the
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network channels. It does not add to the indirect utility flow from repeatedly
choosing the cable option. The reason is that the cable option includes many
different channels, so even when its ratings appear to be state-dependent, it may not
be a result of the viewer choice inertia as is defined for the broadcast network
channels. Although a viewer’s decision as to which channel (or, equivalently, which
program) to watch has a dynamic consequence in this setting, I assume that viewers
are myopic instead of forward-looking. I also assume that there is no heterogeneity
in viewer inertia.8
The show attributes xj include show category gj and whether the show is a new
episode or a rerun if j is an episode of some television series. All broadcast network
programs are categorized as one of the following; comedy; action/crime drama;
other drama; reality/competition shows; news magazine; and sports/specials. fj
captures the quality of program j that is constant within the same title group along
its series run, apart from the preference for the show category. For example, if j is an
episode of an action/crime drama series, this will capture the popularity of the main
plot and characters of the series. If j is ‘‘MLB games,’’ it will capture the average
popularity of professional baseball games.
There are two unobservable variables: njt captures the time- (episode-) specific
quality of show j that may be generated by, for example, the appearance of a
celebrity cameo, or a dramatic turn in the plot. ijt captures the idiosyncratic
preference over the show at time t and is assumed to be drawn from an i.i.d. extreme
value distribution.
With random coefficients on the show categories, I allow for flexible substitution
patterns among the four network channels. As for the distribution of the random
coefficients, I take the standard assumption in the literature that the vector of viewer
type bi is drawn from the multivariate normal distribution WðbiÞ with a diagonal
covariance matrix.
I consider another specification where the mean coefficients on the show
categories vary with the time slots. This is to control for the effects of changes in
demographic compositions in viewers along the prime-time hours on the broadcast
schedules. This specification assumes that bigs is drawn from a normal distribution
with mean bgs and standard deviation rg. Note that the standard deviation is not
specific to the time slot while the mean is. This parsimonious specification is mainly
to confine the computational burden that result from an increase in the number of
nonlinear parameters that need to be estimated.
Note that there is no random coefficient for the composite cable channel, to
which no show category can be assigned. As a result, a viewer with a strong
preference for, say, comedy shows is not more likely to substitute toward cable
Footnote 7 continued
same show category follows. For action drama and reality television, the lead-in effect is smaller if a
program that is in the same show category follows. One could argue this is evidence that there is some
diminishing marginal utility from watching shows in the same genre in a row for some genres.
8 Shachar and Emerson (2000) allow viewers to switch channels every quarter hour, and also allow the
switching costs to vary with show categories and viewer demographics. They find that the switching costs
increase for female and older viewers, and for genres with a continuous plot such as drama.
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television than turning off television when no comedy show is offered by the
network channels. This is unrealistic, and can be relaxed by allowing viewer
preferences for television programs to be correlated. The main difficulty with such
an approach is that it is hard to find a valid instrument for the added non-linear
parameter that captures the correlation among television channels, especially in
addition to instrumental variables for the viewer preference heterogeneity terms. I
instead estimate a standard nested logit model without random coefficients on
program genres as a part of robustness check.
The probability of viewer i watching show j at time t, conditional on her
watching network nit1 at t  1, is given by
P
j
itðnit1Þ ¼
exp dijt þ a  1 nit1 ¼ nj
  
P
k2N
exp dikt þ a  1 nit1 ¼ nkð Þ½  þ exp dct½ 
 
þ 1
:
where dijt ¼ xjbi þ bdd þ bssþ fj þ njt and dct ¼ bdd þ bssþ fc þ nct. The
unconditional probability of viewer i watching TV show j at time t is
P
j
it ¼
P
k2Jt1
Pkit1  PjitðkÞ. The recursiveness in the equation implies that
P
j
it ¼
P
m2J0
Pmi0ð0Þ   
P
l2Jt2
Pkit1ðlÞ
P
k2Jt1
P
j
itðkÞ where time 0 denotes 8:00 p.m. when
prime-time hours begin (before which I assume that no one watches television). The
share (rating) is given by
sjt ¼
Z X
k2Jt1
Pkit1  PjitðkÞdWðbiÞ: ð2Þ
4.1 Discussion
The lack of information on each cable network’s programs and ratings restricts the
empirical model in several ways. All cable/satellite/independent channels are
aggregated into one composite option of watching a television channel other than
the four major networks. Moreover, the composite cable option faces the same day-
of-the-week effects as the broadcast networks, but offers constant quality
throughout the week. This assumption is critical in deriving the inherent weekly
cycle in demand for television viewing from the ratings data. It almost works as
another normalization by setting the weekly cycle in the residual demand for the
broadcast networks to be the same as the weekly cycle in the market demand for
television viewing. If cable networks in fact offered, for example, low-quality
programs on weekends just as the broadcast networks do, the model would bias
upward the underlying demand contraction.
The assumption, however, appears to be true for cable/satellite channels as a
whole. Table 1 shows that the average ratings for cable channels together remain more
or less constant throughout the week, whereas the broadcast networks’ ratings drop
sharply on Friday and Saturday. It indicates that cable networks are less susceptible, or
less responsive to the weekend demand contraction than are the broadcast networks.
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Two explanations can be offered: First, the weekend demand contraction may be
smaller for each cable channel because those who subscribe to cable channels are
the ones who really enjoy watching television and do so even on weekends. Second,
the weekend effect appears to be less severe for cable channels as a whole because
some cable networks gain their audience base on weekends while others lose.
The latter explanation is particularly sensible because many cable channels
appeal to a narrow range of audience, in contrast to the broadcast networks that
target a broader audience. For example, Friday and Saturday evenings are known to
be for children and teenagers, and cable channels (such as Disney Channels,
Cartoon Network, and WB) that target these demographic groups tend to broadcast
their strong programs on weekends. Disney has aired a very popular, original series
Hannah Montana and debuted the highly anticipated made-for-cable movie, High
School Musical 2 on Friday. ESPN is another example. Its ratings tend to rise when
it broadcasts college football games on Saturdays.
The fact that the ratings of cable channels together exhibit no noticeable cycle
whereas the broadcast networks show clearly visible cycles makes the latter more
suitable for the estimation of market contraction effects of placing low-quality
products in low business seasons. Even so, treating the cable television’s strategy to
offer constant quality through the week as exogenous may be viewed as problematic
especially because they together garner the majority of viewers.
On the other hand, no cable/satellite channel alone attains ratings comparable to
those of broadcast networks. For example, in the fall of 2000, 7.93 % of all
television households on average watched a program on one of the four networks,
whereas 2.53 % of cable/satellite households (which was only 80 % of all television
households) watched a program on WB, which was one of the more popular cable
channels. Given each cable/satellite channel’s small share, it is unlikely that the four
major networks consider each individual cable channel’s scheduling strategy to the
same extent as they consider each other’s strategy. The most plausible scenario
would be that the four major networks consider the other channels as a whole while
paying close attention to the schedules of a few, highly popular original cable series
such as ESPN’s Monday Night Football.9
This paper attributes the driving force for broadcast networks to air low-quality
programs on Friday and Saturday to the contraction in the audience base. Other
explanations include changes to the audience composition and advertisers’ demand
for advertising during the week. For example, a convincing explanation for broadcast
networks’ tendency to air high-quality programs on Thursday is that many important
purchases—such as for cars and furniture—are made on weekends and therefore
advertising on Thursday may be most effective, whereas Friday may be too late. This
explanation is well explored in Wilbur (2008) and Wilbur et al. (2013) .10
9 More recently, many original cable series became very successful. For example, AMC’s The Walking
Dead became the most popular cable series in cable television history. Its fifth season premiere retained
17.3 million viewers which would roughly correspond to a broadcast household rating of 6–8.
10 Wilbur (2008) finds that viewers most prefer watching television on Friday evenings, followed by
Thursday, and that advertisers most value Thursday evenings, followed by Friday. He then attributes the
Thursday scheduling to the interaction between the two sides while providing explanations for the less
intuitive results with regard to the Friday scheduling.
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In relation to the changes in viewer demographics, the assumption that the day-
of-the-week effects are additively separable from the program-specific mean utility
can be questioned. Under the specification, all programs are affected by the weekly
demand cycle in the same way. Therefore, the model will ignore any ‘‘synergy’’
between a television series and its broadcast day that may be set to target certain
demographics. As a result, for example, if families are the majority of viewers, and
consequently family drama series are usually offered on Friday nights, the model
may over-estimate those series’ qualities. Unfortunately, the aggregate ratings data
make it impossible to have the day-of-the-week effects depend on viewer
demographics.
4.2 Estimation and Identification
I estimate the model parameters using a two-level algorithm that has been proposed
by Berry et al. (1995).
The inner level recovers mean utilities djtða; rgÞ ¼ xjbþ bdd þ bssþ fj þ njt at
every trial value of the non-linear parameters: a and rg: It starts with an initial guess
of the mean utilities vector, computes the predicted ratings, compares them with the
actual ones, and then updates the mean utilities vector according to the operator that
has been proposed by Berry et al. (1995). The operator is contractive, so it
converges to the unique fixed point at every value of a and rg.
The outer level solves for the linear parameter values b—given the mean utilities
bdjtða; rgÞ —that minimize a GMM sample criterion function and continues to loop
until it finds the global minimizer of fa; rg; bg. Berry et al. (1995) propose a
simulation method to compute the integration in Eq. (2). I draw 200 consumer types
from the standard normal distribution as the first step.
The GMM criterion function arises from the usual orthogonality condition
EðZ 0nÞ ¼ 0, where Z is a matrix of instrumental variables. It implies that the time-
varying show quality njt is orthogonal to the day/time slot allocation conditional on
the observables—particularly conditional on the series (title group) qualities. Since
broadcast networks allocate day/time slots for their various shows before episode-
specific shocks are realized and tend to fix their day-by-day line-ups, this is a
reasonable assumption.
Television series qualities are, in principle, identified by observing the same
show as it competes against different sets of programs and is broadcast on different
days of the week. As shown in Table 3, a broadcast network does not frequently
change the day/time slots for its series during the series’ seasonal run, which dilutes
the variation in the program compositions. The long span of the data enables me to
exploit the variation generated across broadcast seasons: Many series are cancelled,
new series are picked up, and renewed series are moved to different day/time slots
to accommodate new series.
Relying on television series fixed effects to control for endogenous quality
compositions restricts a series’ quality to be constant throughout its broadcast cycle.
This is unlikely to be true, since ratings of a ‘‘popular’’ television series tend to rise,
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hit a peak in a relatively early episode, and then fall before it is cancelled.11 The
broadcasting company may set the day and time based on the projected popularity
of the series for each season. Therefore, the constant quality assumption could bias
the underlying weekend effects upward. To mitigate this problem, I include a
quadratic function of the total number of episodes of the series that have been aired
up to each airing of a new episode.
The underlying day effects are identified from variations in the quality
compositions of television shows that are available on different days of the week.
There are several sources of the variations: The first is the rescheduling of the same
series across its broadcast seasons. Second, the fact that a television network
allocates the day/time slots among its set of series before the ratings are observed
make it possible that the television programs that are scheduled on weekends are of
high quality. However, it is unlikely that a television network broadcasts a widely
popular television series on Friday repeatedly. If a series turns out unexpectedly to
be successful ex-post, it can reschedule the series without incurring much cost. For
example, CSI was originally scheduled to air at 9 p.m. on Friday when the series
premiered, but later moved to Thursday during its first season.
Third, television networks are occasionally forced to shuffle their day-by-day
line-ups. The occurrence of unexpected or irregular events—for example, a World
Series broadcast—would make television networks reschedule regular programs
during the affected weeks. Another example of such occasions include when they
unexpectedly cancel a series and then replace it with another series in the mid-
season. In such case, a network may put the newly picked-up series in the day/time
slot of the replaced series to maintain the rest of its schedules, although this specific
placement may be suboptimal.
The identifying assumption is that such rescheduling, both across and during
broadcast seasons, is not correlated with idiosyncratic quality shocks. To evaluate
this assumption, I consider 103 television series whose entire series from start to
finish occur during the sample period and lasted more than one broadcast season. I
sort them into four groups, depending on the (mode) broadcast days of their first and
final seasons, and compare them in Table 8.
There is some difference in the first-season ratings between the series that
remained to air on weekdays versus the series that were moved to weekends, but the
difference is small. The average seasonal rating declines in the last seasons
compared to the first season for both groups, but the drop is greater for the series
that were moved to weekends. However, considering that they lasted longer on
average (3.28 seasons versus 3.11), and that a part of the decline is due to the
underlying demand contraction on weekends, the two groups seem little different.
The same applies to the series that premiered on weekends, although the number of
such series is too small to draw any meaningful conclusion.
11 Sometimes a series is cancelled because of an increase in costs rather than a decline in ratings.
Production costs tend to rise as television series stretch into several seasons—mainly because the actors
and the others individuals who are involved in the production demand higher salaries. For an example,
read http://www.today.com/id/10881944/ns/today-today_entertainment/t/th-heaven-canceled-due-cost-
network/#.VhI7V_mqqko.
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The comparison result in Table 8 ensures that the rescheduling of a television series
toward its final season is unlikely to be correlated with the time-varying shock to the
series’ value—or at the least, less likely than the first-time scheduling—after I control
for the time-invariant quality of each series and its decay over the lifespan of the series.
The random coefficients on the show category variables are identified from
variation in the distribution of show types that are available at the time of decision-
making and how viewers substitute among the available show types. As the viewer’s
choice is state-dependent due to the extra utility term a, the distribution of viewer
types over the set of available show categories is also state-dependent. An initial
condition is necessary to identify the random coefficients as well as a. I assume that
at the beginning of prime-time (8:00 p.m.), no viewer has been watching any
television, so that all types are available for the decision-making of what to watch.
The identification of the two sets of non-linear parameters—a and standard
deviation of the random coefficients rg—requires instrumental variables. For the
random coefficients on the show category variables, I use the number of available
shows in each category at each time t. The offered composition of show categories
is correlated with the level of the viewer preference heterogeneity because each
broadcast network would consider the preference heterogeneity as well as rival
programs’ genres when assigning a day/time slot to the given program. Also it is
unlikely to be correlated with the idiosyncratic quality shock of the given program.
The extra utility term is identified from the persistency/fluctuations in Nielsen
ratings in comparison to the persistency/fluctuations in the observed variables. I use
an indicator variable of whether the leading program is a new episode or a rerun of
television series as an instrument. By requiring the lagged rerun variable to be
uncorrelated with the unobserved idiosyncratic quality shock njt conditional on the
extra utility term, the moment condition restricts the extent to which the unobserved
term explains the observed persistency/fluctuations in the daily Nielsen ratings.12
5 Estimation Results
This section presents the parameter estimates of the baseline random coefficient
model as well as those of the nested logit model. I consider three specifications that
differ with respect to the inclusion of television series fixed effects and the show
Table 8 Rescheduling of television series
First season Last season No. of obs. No. of seasons First season ratings Last season ratings
Weekdays Weekdays 75 3.11 7.13 4.50
Weekends 18 3.28 6.90 3.83
Weekends Weekdays 1 2.00 6.01 4.07
Weekends 9 2.67 6.50 5.03
12 Yeo and Miller (2016) explain how the use of a lagged instrumental variable identifies a term that
captures state-dependence of a choice, such as the extra utility term in this study or switching costs in
their study.
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category and time slot interaction terms. I also present the result from a
counterfactual analysis that tests the optimality of the actual schedules given the
parameter estimates.
5.1 Baseline Model
Table 9 shows that the estimated weekend effect is dampened as the empirical
model accounts for variation in the television series qualities. The estimated
weekend effect is most pronounced in specification I, which does not include the
title group dummy variables. The negative coefficients on Friday and Saturday are
5–6 times larger than the coefficient on Thursday under this specification, but the
differentials are much reduced in specification II and III—both of which control for
television series qualities. This result indicates that the inherent contraction in
television viewership in weekends are amplified by broadcasting companies’
program scheduling choices.
The extra utility term a estimates are only statistically significant in specification
II and III. To put the values in ‘‘utils’’ into perspective, I compute the average
probability that a viewer who watches a network channel switches to a different
channel at the end of a show, first, given the a estimate and then, when it is
counterfactually set to zero. I simulate choices of the same set of 200 randomly
drawn viewers to compute the counterfactual probabilities.
Under specification III, 43 % viewers instead of 50 % would switch if there were
no extra utility from watching shows back-to-back on the same network channel. It
is 47 % instead 49 % under specification II. These results imply a moderate lead-in
effect. If the first prime-time show’s rating increases by 1 %, the network will see an
increase in the network’s daily rating of around 2 %.
The estimates of a increase as the model includes more controls for program
qualities. This may seem counter-intuitive if one expected that more controls would
have the (serial) correlation in ratings among programs on the same channel on the
same day explained less by the extra utility but more by their similar qualities. The
subtle difference is that a is identified by how an increase in the utility from
watching a program—more precisely, its unobserved part—is related to the utility
from the proceeding program, and not by how the utility levels per se co-move along
the days of the week.
All of the linear coefficients are negative as expected from the fact that the mean
utility of the most popular option—not watching television—is normalized to zero.
The ‘‘mean’’ viewer appears to prefer reality television shows the most in
specification II and III. News magazine and comedy follow. Under specification I,
reality television is a close second after news magazine.
The estimates of rg, which measure the viewer heterogeneity in preferences for
television program genres, are only statistically and economically significant for
comedy, action/crime drama, and sports and specials in specification I and II. Under
specification II, the preference for ‘‘Sports, Special, and Others’’ is the most
heterogeneous (1.635), while the preference for ‘‘Comedy’’ is the most homogenous
(0.965). It is plausible that comedy appeals to a broader audience than any other
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genre, and that sports or award ceremony broadcasts appeal to a narrower audience.
On the other hand, it could have arisen from the fact that television programs that
are categorized as ‘‘Sports, Special, and Others’’ are actually in various formats,
themes, and contents whereas programs under the comedy category are mostly
‘‘sitcom’’ .
Under specification III, none of the standard deviation estimates are statistically
significant, which implies no heterogeneity in viewer preferences for show
categories. Though this is fairly common in the literature on random coefficient
discrete choice models, it may be due to the restriction on the distribution of viewer
types. Recall that I assume that the variance is constant while the mean preference
changes across the prime-time hours in order to confine the number of non-linear
parameters that need to be estimated.
The rerun variable yields the expected negative sign and is statistically significant
in all three specifications. The coefficients in the quadratic function that accounts for
decay of popularity of television series are mostly significant in all three
specifications. Interestingly, the signs of the linear and quadratics terms flip once
the model includes television series fixed effects.
The decay function estimates under specifications II and III point to a U-shaped
relationship between the ratings of a television series and its age. Because of the
much smaller coefficient value on the quadratic term, however, the series’ quality
decreases over its broadcast cycle for all series in the sample. Although a few
popular television series in the sample that have lasted multiple seasons exhibit a
rise in the ratings in their early seasons, the estimated decay function does not reflect
it. I suspect that this is because most of television series in the sample were
cancelled after their first seasons, and their ratings tend to decrease even in the first
seasons.
In Table 10, I further examine the implications of controlling for program
qualities. The first panel reports the average flow utility net of the day effect—
djt  bdd  bss—for a network television show over the sample period. This value
reflects the overall extent that a program is liked. The results under specification I
indicate that the programs aired on weekends are overall of higher quality than are
the average shows aired on the other days. This counter-intuitive result highlights
the importance of controlling for show qualities. Under specification II, the utility
flow from the average Friday and Saturday show is respectively 4 and 11 % lower
than that of the average show on weekdays. Under specification III, the difference in
the utility levels between the average weekend program and the average weekday
program further widens.
The second panel in Table 10 reports the mean value of the unobserved show
qualities (njt). In principle, there should be little weekly cycles in the idiosyncratic
quality shocks. The table clearly shows that as the empirical model controls for the
endogenous scheduling, cyclicality in njt along the days of the week diminishes. For
example, the average value of the idiosyncratic program quality is highest on
Thursdays—the day with the highest average rating—under specification I, but only
moderately high, and lower than the Wednesday’s under specifications II and III.
However, the weekend and weekday differentials are still present in these
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specifications. All in all, though imperfect, Specification III does a reasonably good
job in controlling for the endogenous quality compositions.
5.2 Robustness Check: Nested Logit Model
Having random coefficients on the show categories in the model allows for flexible
viewer substitution patterns amongst available television shows. However, because
the random coefficients are on the categories for shows on the broadcast networks
only, it restricts the substitution between a network channel and the composite cable
option to be no different from that between a network channel and not watching
television at all. This may be unrealistic as viewers on the broadcast networks are
more likely to substitute toward a cable channel instead of not watching at all when
the broadcast networks offer programs of low quality.
To allow preferences for television viewing to be correlated across available
programs, I estimate a nested logit model of the television program choice. As
before, viewer i’s utility from watching a program in series (title group) j on
television network nj 2 N at time t is given by
uijt ¼ djt þ a  1 nit1 ¼ nj
 þ mit þ ð1 rÞijt ð3Þ
where djt ¼ xjbþ bdd þ bssþ fj þ njt, group 1 is fABC;CBS;NBC; FOX;Cableg,
and group 0 is fNo TVg. ijt is the i.i.d. logit error term. mit is common to all
Table 10 Average program qualities
M T W Th F Sa
Average program qualities
Spec. I
Mean -2.5226 -2.5059 -2.4546 -2.4100 -2.4986 -2.4687
SD .5968 .7074 .7261 .7686 .6996 .5882
Spec. II
Mean -2.1996 -2.1966 -2.2213 -2.1004 -2.3185 -2.4865
SD .4700 .5207 .5322 .6256 .5271 .5484
Spec. III
Mean -2.0130 -1.9940 -2.0429 -1.9484 -2.1470 -2.3581
SD .4372 .4429 .4466 .5778 .4531 .4671
Mean idiosyncratic quality shocks
Spec. I
Idiosyncratic Quality njt .0365 .0235 .0131 .0506 -.0491 -.1053
Spec. II
njt .0217 .0144 .0242 .0217 -.0303 -.0723
Series Quality fj .6704 .7382 .6790 .7868 .6664 .4627
Spec. III
njt .0195 .0101 .0228 .0210 -.0288 -.0626
fj .6525 .7545 .6606 .7710 .6520 .4084
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alternatives in group g ¼ 1 and drawn from the unique distribution that leads mit þ
ð1 rÞijt to follow the type one extreme value distribution. As r approaches one,
the within-group correlation approaches one, and as r approaches zero, the model
collapse to a standard logit specification.
Conditional on viewer i watching network channel n at t  1, the probability of
her watching show j at time t is
P
j
itðnÞ ¼
exp ðdjt þ a  1 n ¼ nj
 Þ=ð1 rÞ 
VgrðVð1rÞg þ 1Þ
; ð4Þ
where Vg ¼
P
k2N exp
dkt þ a  1 n ¼ nkð Þ
1 r
 	
þ exp dct
1 r
 	
. The probability of not
watching television is P0itðnÞ ¼
1
V
ð1rÞ
g þ 1
.
If not for the extra term that captures the viewer inertia a, a regression equation
could be derived in which the difference in the channel j’s market share and the
share of No TV in log is the flow utility djt plus r times the log of j’s inside market
share, as shown in Berry (1994) and Einav (2007). Then the model parameters
including r would be estimated by regressing the difference in the log market shares
on the inside share and the observed attributes of program j, given an instrumental
variable for the endogenous inside share term. This approach is not feasible here
because the observed market shares are not equal to the conditional choice
probabilities due to the state-dependence nature of the program choice.
Instead, I solve for the djt that generates the observed market shares at each trial
value of a and r. As I assume that shows that begin at 8:00 p.m. ðt ¼ 0Þ are not
affected by viewer inertia, djt for t ¼ 0 can be analytically solved for:
djt ¼ ð1 rÞ lnðsjtÞ þ ln 1 s0t
s0t
  1
1r
þ 1 s0t
s0t
  r
1r
( )" #
: ð5Þ
I then numerically solve forward for djt for t 1 and evaluate a GMM objective
function with the solution fdjtða; rÞg.
The identifying condition is that the unobserved time-varying program quality is
orthogonal to the broadcast day and hour conditional on the observed character-
istics, and uncorrelated with instruments for two non-linear parameters. The lagged
rerun indicator is once again used for the viewer inertia parameter a. As for the r
that determines how viewers substitutes amongst the available television channels, I
use the number of programs in the same category as program j as an instrument.
Table 11 presents the estimation results. The estimates are qualitatively similar to
those from the random coefficient model in Table 9. r is economically and
statistically significant in all three specifications, which implies that substitution
patterns differ considerably in the choice of which channel to watch, and in whether
to watch television or not.
One interesting observation is that as the extra utility from staying tuned to the
same channel a increases, the within-group correlation of utility levels r decreases.
This result is intuitive: The larger is the extra utility term, the larger is the extent to
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which continuous television viewing, which includes both switching to a different
channel and remaining on the same channel, is explained by the extra utility term
rather than by the within-group correlation.
The differentials in the estimated coefficients for the broadcast day dummy
variables between weekdays and weekends tend to be slightly smaller under the
nested logit model than under the random coefficient model. However, it does not
automatically imply that the underlying weekend effects are biased upward in the
previous random coefficient model because this should be evaluated in terms of
predicted differentials in ratings between weekdays and weekends. I present these
values in Sect. 6.
5.3 Optimality of Program Schedules
To examine the estimates from the demand model, I test whether each television
network could have raised its ratings by reshuffling its weekly program schedule.
The basic premise behind this exercise is that a television network schedules its
programs to maximize its overall ratings in any given broadcast season. Although
the relationship between ratings and advertising revenue is not exactly monotonic,
the correlation between the Nielsen rating of a program and the advertising cost for
a 30-second slot during its broadcast is known to be very high (Goettler 2012).
Another critical assumption is that the decision to broadcast a television series is
exogenous to the scheduling decision; that is, the set of available series and
programs is fixed.
I adopt pairwise swaps as a reshuffling scheme. For example, consider two
television series s and s0 that are broadcast on, say, ABC, and suppose that s was
Table 11 Robustness check:
nested logit specification
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p\0:01; ** p\0:05;
* p\0:10.
The linear part of each
specification is the same as the
previous random coefficient
models
Specification I II III
a 8.304*** .387*** 2.947***
(.017) (.010) (.029)
r .726*** .554*** .472***
(.004) (.013) (.005)
Tuesday .049*** .046*** .062***
(.007) (.013) (.012)
Wednesday .095*** .079*** .079***
(.013) (.016) (.007)
Thursday .074*** .093*** .128***
(.014) (.017) (.009)
Friday .347*** .331*** .309***
(.026) (.046) (.024)
Saturday .451*** .408*** .362***
(.024) (.045) (.023)
Series FE N Y Y
Time Slot FE Y Y Y
Year (TV season) FE Y Y Y
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broadcast on day d at time slot s while s0 was broadcast on d0 at slot s0 during some
broadcast season. I test whether ABC’s overall ratings in that season would have
risen if it had instead assigned series s to ðd0; s0Þ and s0 to ðd; sÞ .
I select pairs of television series based on several criteria: First, for two series to
be considered as a swappable pair, they should have the same duration in terms of
the number of 30-min time slots that an episode of each series takes. Second, the
smaller of the numbers of new episodes of the two series should be at least 10 and
the difference between the numbers should be less than 30 % of the smaller. These
restrictions are to ensure that the two series are sufficiently similar in terms of the
number of days and hours that are needed to broadcast them during the season, and
that the number of swaps generated is large enough to cancel the effect of
idiosyncratic quality shocks on the counterfactual ratings. The algorithm returns a
total of 1056 pairs of television series.
Last, I fix the utility levels that are offered by all of the other channels rather than
the network that broadcasts the swapped pair. This treatment is consistent with the
assumption that the observed program schedules are a Nash equilibrium strategy
profile of a simultaneous scheduling game among the broadcast networks.
To see how this exercise helps validate the parameter estimates of interest,
suppose that a broadcast network’s ratings increase under some counterfactual
schedule. Because the underlying demand for television viewing and the series’
qualities are not affected by the rescheduling, the increase in the average weekly
rating points to a mismatch between programs and their broadcast times in the actual
schedule.
There are three paths through which the rescheduling can generate a better
match: First is the exogenous weekly cycle in demand for television viewing.
Second, each program in a pair now faces a different set of competing programs. A
sitcom, for example, may do better than a crime drama against reality television
shows that are on competing channels.13 The third path is the lead-in effect as each
program now has a different preceding and following program.14
Under the assumption that the actual schedule constitutes a Nash strategy profile,
if many counterfactual schedules appear better than the actual schedule, one can
raise suspicion about the parameter estimates that govern the three paths that are
listed above. For this counterfactual exercise, I simulated the choices of 500
randomly drawn viewers. Table 12 presents the results.
As we expected, when the empirical model controls for the endogenous
relationship between the series qualities and their broadcast days and hours, the
actual scheduling is better rationalized. This reinforces the importance of
controlling for television program qualities to separate the underlying day effects
from the observed ones. However, the differences between the three specifications
13 Given the discrete choice demand system, program qualities are strategic complements, which implies
that a broadcasting company will not put a strong program against its competitors’ weak programs.
14 Note that only the rating of a program affects the subsequent program’s rating. The distribution of
viewers from the preceding program matters only through the assumption about the timing of the decision
because viewers of the preceding program automatically become available to watch the following
program, whereas viewers on other channels may be stuck with continuing programs. Otherwise, the
distribution would not matter because there is no correlation across preferences for show categories.
The Weekend Effect in Television Viewership and Prime-Time...
123
are not large. This is likely a consequence of overfitting: The number of swapping
pairs is small compared to the number of parameter estimates that governs the
resulting changes in the ratings: eight linear and seven non-linear for specifications I
and II; 26 linear and seven non-linear in specification III.
At most, 23 % of the rescheduling cases lead to an increase in the average weekly
rating for the broadcast network. This does not immediately imply that the broadcast
networks failed to maximize ratings or that the estimates are biased. There are
several limitations to this exercise: First, many pairs of television series that are
included in this exercise may not have been actually swappable at the time of
scheduling due to the difference in the number of episodes in each series. Second,
the numbers of swaps for some pairs are not large enough to neutralize the effects of
idiosyncratic quality shocks.
Last, there can be other factors that are omitted from the model that make two
television series undesirable for a swap. There may be synergies between a certain
program genre and a certain day of the week—for example, a family drama and
Friday—or some genre-specific synergies between two successive programs, such
as that a crime drama that follows a sitcom is better than another sitcom that follows
a sitcom. Though limited by a somewhat arbitrary selection of counterfactual
schedules, this exercise shows that the estimates of the underlying broadcast day
and hour effects are reasonably consistent with the revealed preference principle.
6 Decomposing the Observed Weekend Effect
In this section, I decompose the observed drops in the program ratings on weekends
into the intrinsic demand contraction and the endogenous market contraction that is
caused by broadcasting companies’ scheduling low-quality programs on weekends.
To this end, I consider two counterfactual scenarios: one with no underlying day-of-
the-week effects and another with no endogenous scheduling. I simulate choices of
1000 randomly drawn viewers to document how ratings change, compared to the
actual ratings, under each scenario. Table 13 reports the counterfactual ratings. The
first panel presents the actual average ratings for comparison.
The first counterfactual scenario is that there is no underlying day effects in
demand for television programs. I compute the predicted ratings under this scenario
Table 12 Counterfactual analysis: optimality of program schedules
Specification No. of pairs I II III
ABC 228 194 193 176
NBC 275 199 203 217
CBS 455 367 370 416
Fox 98 50 60 69
Total 1056 810 (76.7 %) 826 (78.2 %) 878 (83.1 %)
J. Yeo
123
by setting the coefficients for the day dummy variables to be constant at the
estimated coefficient for Tuesday. The simulation results predict that the average
rating falls by around 21 % in weekends, both under the random coefficient (RC)
and nested logit (NL) model. As the actual ratings fall by 31 % in weekends, it
implies that the variation in the show qualities accounts for about two-thirds of the
observed drop in weekend ratings.
The bottom panel reports the counterfactual ratings when there is no endogenous
scheduling. To remove the effect of the endogenous scheduling, I keep the program-
specific part of utility constant across the days of the week. Specifically, I set each
program’s broadcast day and hour invariant utility level— xjbi þ fj þ njt—in each
broadcast year to be constant at the utility level of the network’s average Thursday
program in that year. Thus, given a network and a broadcast year, programs differ in
utilities that they deliver only through the day- and time-slot-specific part: bdd þ
bss . This approach directly alters the available utility levels at each time of
decision-making, and hence is less comparable to the actual ratings than the first
counterfactual scenario. Under this scenario, the average rating falls by 9 % under
the RC model, which implies that roughly less than a third of the observed rating
drops on weekends can be attributed to the intrinsic contraction in demand for
television watching. It is 14 % under the NL model.
Table 13 Counterfactual ratings
M T W Th F Sa Mon–Thu Fri–Sat
Average per-program rating
Actual 7.39 7.16 6.98 7.86 5.44 4.67 7.35 5.10
Scenario 1
RC Spec. II 7.29 7.02 6.89 7.90 6.06 5.44 7.27 5.79
RC Spec. III 7.40 7.12 6.96 7.99 6.15 5.47 7.37 5.85
NL Spec. III 7.39 7.16 7.04 8.12 6.21 5.46 7.42 5.87
Scenario 2
RC Spec. II 7.49 7.02 7.06 6.88 6.37 6.45 7.11 6.40
RC Spec. III 7.41 7.12 7.11 6.91 6.41 6.68 7.14 6.53
NL Spec. III 9.08 7.16 7.38 7.12 6.43 6.83 7.67 6.61
Average HUT
Actual 64.37 63.41 62.21 62.40 55.95 54.28 63.13 55.12
Scenario 1
RC Spec. II 64.57 63.32 62.40 63.72 63.36 63.65 63.53 63.50
RC Spec. III 64.67 63.46 62.35 63.67 63.17 63.08 63.57 63.13
NL Spec. III 64.37 63.41 62.63 64.02 62.16 61.75 63.63 61.96
Scenario 2
RC Spec. II 65.20 63.32 62.43 61.56 55.38 55.06 63.17 55.22
RC Spec. III 65.54 63.46 63.00 62.09 55.99 56.36 63.57 56.17
NL Spec. III 65.08 63.41 62.68 61.48 56.28 55.31 63.20 55.80
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Note that, under scenario 1, the share of households who watch television (HUT)
does not drop on weekends although the network channels still offer low-quality
programs on weekends. This is because the removal of the day-of-the-week effects
makes watching television more attractive than not watching, even on weekends,
which causes the shares of the cable option (which delivers a constant level of utility
throughout the week) to rise dramatically.
7 Conclusion
The observed decline in television program ratings on Fridays and Saturdays is
likely a result of two factors: intrinsic shrinkage in demand for television viewing in
weekends, and the market contraction effect that arises from endogenous
scheduling. In this paper, I decompose the two effects: I model a viewer’s problem
as a discrete choice problem where the choices are whether to watch one of the four
broadcast network channels, a cable channel, or not to watch television at all. The
utility from watching a television program depends on the broadcast day of the week
as well as the program’s attributes (such as the show category) that interact with the
viewer’s type.
I estimate the model with the use of the method that has been proposed by Berry
et al. (1995). The identifying condition is that idiosyncratic show quality shocks are
orthogonal to the broadcast day/time slots conditional on the observables. The
condition requires one to control for systematic or expected heterogeneity in
program qualities that affect the television network’s scheduling decision. The long
span of the data that are used to estimate the model enables me to control for
television series qualities using a fixed-effect approach. The estimation results
reveal that the estimated weekend effect is dampened when the empirical model
accounts for variation in the television series qualities.
To examine further the estimates from the demand model, I test whether the
estimated broadcast day and hour effects justify the observed schedules as a Nash
equilibrium strategy. To this end, I consider a reshuffling of the network’s line-ups
generated by pairwise swaps of the broadcast days and hours between two television
series. The network rating decreases compared to the actual rating in more than
75 % of the counterfactual reshuffling cases. It implies that the estimates of the
underlying broadcast day and hour effects are reasonably consistent with the
television networks’ rating maximization.
The results of counterfactual simulation indicate that the market contraction
effect from endogenous scheduling accounts for two-thirds of the rating drops on
weekends while the intrinsic contraction in demand for television watching accounts
for only the remaining third.
It remains unanswered whether the estimated weekend effect in television
viewership captures the disinclination for watching videos in general (which
includes, for example, video streaming on Netflix) rather than engaging in more
active leisure or outdoor activities in weekend, or simply the disinclination for more
narrowly defined, linear television viewing. This question is worth investigating
because it may reveal a central difference between the two alternative modes of
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entertainment—online video streaming and traditional television viewing, one
waxing and one waning—and can be relatively easily answered. Because the set of
available videos is more-or-less constant throughout the week, the observed
weekend effect, if any, in the online video streaming service market is likely equal
to the intrinsic demand contraction effect.
Also, industry stakeholders and policy makers may be interested in how the
growing popularity of online television affects the market contraction effect and,
consequently, broadcasting companies’ program scheduling strategies. One can
conjecture that the wide availability of online video streaming services amplifies the
market contraction effect of broadcasting weak programs on weekends because
viewers can more easily substitute away from low-quality television shows on
weekends toward high-quality shows that were originally broadcast on weekdays. I
leave this for future research.
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